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RUSSIAN GOVERNORS GENERAL, 1775-1825
 
Territorial or functional administration?*
 
In May 2000, the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, announced the
creation of seven administrative regions, corresponding to the seven military districts
already in existence, each to be headed by a presidential representative, dubbed
“governor general” by historically minded commentators. The decision is certain to
re-invigorate the old debate on the regionalization of government in Russia that
began with the appointment of the first governors in 1708 and of the central colleges
in 1717. Regionalization was very much a feature of Catherine II’s reforms of the
central and local government. It pitted ministers against governors general in the
1810s and fell victim to the ministers’ victory. The creation of Soviet socialist
republics and the debate over the nature of Soviet federalism brought the issue to the
fore once again, but the victory of “democratic centralism” drained regional forms of
their intrinsic content. It will take a while to assess the fate of Putin’s experiment.
The administration of any geographical area always raises two fundamental
questions: one is whether the several sectors of local administration should operate
independently under the guidance of their own central agencies or be primarily
responsible to a local authority subordinated as a unit to the central government. The
other is what kind of relationship should prevail between that authority and the
central government: should this government be a coordinating body like a committee




 The larger the geographical area, the
 






* A first version of this article was delivered at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales
in May 1995. I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Wladimir Berelowitch for his invitation.
This article is a study of the governor general’s administrative responsibilities. It follows the
publication of another three dedicated to governors general as members of the ruling families:
see “Frontier governors general 1772-1825,” Jahrbücher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 47
(1999): 56-88, 48(2000):161-183 and 321-340. A second part will examine the debate on








more complex these relationships are likely to be, and nowhere were they more
complex than in the Russian empire, spread across an entire continent and formed by
the annexation of territories with distinct societies and traditions. From the
annexation of the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan in the 1550s to the near
completion of the empire by the 1820s, following the inclusion of the frontiers of the
Swedish, Polish, and Persian empires and the substantial penetration of the Ottoman
frontier, Russia had to deal with this issue, but it was not until Peter’s reign that
regionalization assumed its modern form.
In the seventeenth century, the Muscovite government had been a deconcentrated




) were responsible for the various
administrative functions, each chancery enjoying considerable autonomy under the








 in charge of a




); they had few responsibilities beyond the
collection of revenue and the maintenance of order. Nevertheless, the entire




, who was accountable not
to the government as a whole but to the chancery which had appointed him. Such a
system was centralized, because it vested all the powers of decision in the central









 of neighboring towns could depend on different chanceries. However, in
the borderlands of the north, Smolensk, the middle and lower Volga, and Siberia,
clusters of towns did constitute larger territories administered by one central agency,




 Area administration was vested not in a
provincial or regional authority but in one of a number of chanceries. It was very
much an ad hoc system, chanceries created piecemeal as circumstances required and
disbanded when they were no longer needed, the elite having a vested interest in
 
2. Definitions are in order here to clarify the meaning of terms which are often used too loosely.




 when its agencies are made to depend on a coordinating




 when those agencies
operate autonomously under the guidance of, say, a tsar, who either lacks interest in day-to-day
administration or is unable to coordinate their activities in his own person. A central








 refer to the type of
relationships prevailing between central and local agencies. It can be mild or extreme. Creating
local elective bodies and giving them some powers is also a form of decentralization. At the




 when a governor or governor





agencies owe their primary allegiance to their central agencies, leaving the governor in a













refers to an area encompassing more than one province. These definitions were inspired by
L. Aucoc, 
 
Conférences sur l’administration et le droit administratif
 
  (Paris, 1885), 3 vol., here
1:101, 112. See also W. Eberhard, 
 
Conquerors and rulers. Social forces in medieval China
 
(Leiden, 1965), 2nd revised ed.: 63-65.
3. B. Chicherin, 
 
Oblastnye uchrezhdeniia v XVIII-m veke
 
 (Moscow, 1856) remains the standard












(Brockgauz and Efron), 25 (1898): 186-196 and A. Chernov, “O klassifikatsii tsentral’nykh




, 1 (1958): 195-201. For the
administration of the former khanate of Kazan see I. Ermolaev, 
 
Srednee Povolzh’e vo vtoroi
polovine XVI-XVII vv.
 
 (Kazan, 1982): 52-62, 162-175.
 




maintaining the resulting confusion. Peter’s determination to “modernize” the
Muscovite government created an entire new set of demands which the old system
could no longer meet.
Tsar Peter ’s voyage to Holland and England in 1697 strengthened his conviction
that the Muscovite world had become dangerously isolated from European political,
economic and cultural developments; the disastrous defeat at Narva at the outset of
the war with Sweden in 1700 convinced him that the government of Muscovy could
not extract the resources needed to sustain the war effort against a great power. Peter
as commander in chief in the field grew accustomed to dealing with individual
commanders responsible for a specific theater of war. In 1708, on the eve of Charles
XII’s onslaught on Russia, the tsar shifted this area, territorial, type of





) of unequal size, each one headed by a governor given full





 were abolished. In 1711, however, a new coordinating
agency was created, called the Senate, to relieve the ruler from the burden of day to
day administration. Six years later, new executive agencies were added, called




From then on, and until the Revolution of 1917, tsar, Senate (later the Committee of
Ministers), ministers, and governors would remain the major building blocks of the
imperial government. Before turning to the two periods during which another
attempt was made to regionalize the government of the empire on a systematic basis
(1775-1796 and 1815-1825), let us examine the legacy of the Petrine reforms which






Centralization remained the characteristic feature. The Russian government had
grown out of the tsar’s household and never lost traces of its origin. The tsar was the
source of all legitimacy and the grand patron of the vast network of clientage that
made up the imperial ruling elite and ruling class. He was also the grand treasurer of
the empire and this, more than anything else, enabled him to maintain a tight
control over the operations of government — or at least to imagine that he did. But
a central government must also deal with organizational problems and determine
the relationships among its component parts.
 
4. J. LeDonne, 
 
Absolutism and ruling class. The formation of the Russian political order 1700-
1825
 
 (New York, 1991): 68-80.
5. Regional administration during the imperial period has remained almost completely
neglected in scholarship. The basic work still remains A. Gradovskii, “Istoricheskii ocherk





1904), 9 vol., here 1: 301-338. It was first published in 1869 and was much colored by
contemporary concerns over abuses of administrative power. See also G. v. Rauch, 
 
Russland.
Staatliche Einheit und nationale Vielfalt
 






The imperial government after 1725 became once again a highly deconcentrated
structure. While the number of colleges remained more or less constant, other









began to proliferate until their number by mid-century was about equal to that of
their seventeenth-century predecessors. The Senate of about a dozen members
remained the coordinating agency and appellate court for cases that could not be
decided in the colleges, but its function as executive of the imperial government
was taken over, during the reign of Anna Ivanovna, by the Cabinet, dominated by
its chief, Andrei Osterman. Later, during the reign of Elizabeth, the procurator
general of the Senate emerged as the dominant figure in the civilian establishment,
and his office became the coordinating agency for all the colleges and chanceries
responsible for civil administration. The colleges of war, navy, and foreign affairs
had always enjoyed considerable autonomy from Senate control, and the president
of the college of war gradually emerged as the counterpart (and rival), first of




 And these two high-ranking members of
the elite, who belonged to the ruling families, were among the closest associates of




 But the larger number of
agencies, the fact that they were headed by men appointed by the ruler who
remained determined to retain direct links with them, had the effect of creating a
highly deconcentrated structure in which agencies, like the old chanceries,
succeeded in gaining a considerable measure of operational autonomy. Such
autonomy was made possible by the absence of a national budget; as a result, many
agencies collected and disbursed funds, even if expenditures required the ruler’s
often nominal approval. The most convincing proof of that operational autonomy
was that when Catherine II came to the throne in 1762, no one really knew how




The provincial administration was likewise deconcentrated. Two issues require
examination here: the governor’s relationships with the officials and agencies of his
province, and his relationships with the central government. Governors were
appointed by the ruler and were nominally responsible to him, but the prevailing
consensus on centralization and the resulting immensity of detailed information
reaching the government required them to be in constant contact with the Senate and
the colleges: it had been decreed in 1722 that the governors must send their reports
to the college responsible for the subject matter reported on. Their primary
operational link was no longer with the ruler, as had been the case after 1708. The
governor became a delegate of the central government, enjoying, as such, a universal
competence over the entire structure of provincial administration, but he was
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accountable to a government already splintered among functional lines. To make
matters worse, it became common practice not only for the Senate but also for the
colleges to fine governors for what these agencies, possessing by definition a narrow
vision of administration, considered derelictions of duty. The hostility of the
governors to what they viewed as a downgrading of their position caused this





 A model was gradually taking shape, in which the eight or nine
delegates of the elite across the vast expanse of the empire were given universal
competence but were in fact responsible not to the imperial executive —the
Senate — but to its executive agencies with a jurisdiction defined in functional terms.
The result was an asymmetrical system — functional administration at the center,
territorial management in the provinces.
But the governor’s effective power was threatened by certain developments. Some
of the colleges and chanceries created their own provincial agencies. Their personnel
were appointed by the Senate on the recommendation of the college, not of the
governor. They followed the instructions of their colleges and were in fact
independent from him. The effect was to encroach not so much on the universal
jurisdiction of the governor as on his ability to translate that competence into
managerial authority and power. As it was, that power was quite limited. The governor
appointed the clerks in his chancery, but the secretary was appointed by the Senate,
although he may have been recommended by the governor. Since there were no local
courts, the governor was also a judge, but the 1753 decision to suspend the application
of the death penalty considerably reduced his latitude in criminal affairs. In civil
matters, most litigation had to take place in the colleges in Moscow; in fiscal matters,
the governor was empowered to conclude contracts to the value of 3,000 rubles (while
a college negotiated contracts valued up to 10,000 rubles). On the other hand, he was
responsible for the maintenance of order and commanded the garrisons deployed in his





 Elsewhere, his jurisdiction did not translate into effective
power. The governor was slowly becoming an inspector: he watched over the
operations of the provincial administration, toured his provinces, looked for abuses
and reported them to the appropriate college where action might (or might not) be














10. I. Andreevskii, 
 
O namestnikakh, voevodakh i gubernatorakh 
 
(Petersburg, 1864): 115-120,




  207-208. The basic work here is Iu. Got’e,
 
Istoriia oblastnogo upravleniia v Rossii ot Petra I do Ekateriny II
 
 (Moscow, 1913), vol. 1: 401-
405, 435, 457-458. See also V. Grigor’ev, 
 
Reforma mestnogo upravleniia pri Ekaterine II
 
(Petersburg, 1910): 95.
11. For a description of the responsibilities of an inspector in the army see the 1731 instruction
in 
 
Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii (PSZ)
 
, 1st series 1649-1830 (Petersburg,
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It was also during this period, between 1725 and the 1760s, that the
administrative region was born. The reform of 1719 had divided 9 of the 11

















 was appointed by the Senate; so was his
secretary. He had even fewer powers than the governor, and in judicial and fiscal
affairs almost none, beside collecting taxes and creating difficulties in judicial




 Tradition and  practice insisted that
he was not subordinated to the governor, but must maintain  direct relations with the
central colleges through the office of the governor,  unless he resided in a town
closer to Moscow than the provincial capital. In such  cases, he just ignored the
governor. Thus, in a still very vague way, the idea  of the administrative region




 as the basic  territorial unit was part of a large
province headed by a member of the  elite — usually a major or lieutenant




, usually  a colonel. The governor was thus
the prototype of the future governor general.
Catherine II’s great reforms were motivated by a number of basic
considerations. There was much discontent with the operations of the
administrative system created after Peter’s death. That discontent must be placed in
the context of a reaction against the overcentralization of government in the
colleges and the Senate, against the militarization of public life. Many members of
the ruling class yearned to return to the land, or at least to find a secure haven in it,
and create the rudiments of a civil society, but one including only themselves and,
at most, the upper levels of the merchantry. Almost everybody else was degraded to
the status of dependent people. This movement was part of a larger one affecting
most of Europe, in which the nobility sought to emancipate itself from the too strict
control of its destiny by government officials, members of the ruling elite. It was
therefore a movement seeking to decentralize the social constitution of the ruling
class and thereby the operations of government, by transferring a great deal of









 addressed to the Legislative Commission in 1767, answered Catherine’s
determination to play the legislator in the name of Enlightenment philosophy —
administrative uniformity, separation of the judiciary from the administration,
regular  procedures.




 were abolished but became the core of smaller provinces: their number




 Each province was headed by





















15. J. LeDonne, “The territorial reform of the Russian empire 1775-1796. I. Central Russia,
1775-1784,” 
 
Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique,
 
 23, 2 (1982): 147-185.
 




to become a provincial board, justice was administered in two chambers, and fiscal
affairs in a treasury chamber. At first glance, it seemed that provincial
administration remained deconcentrated, but that was not the case, because the very
loose system of local agencies representing the central colleges had now been
streamlined to include only three, and these were given extensive responsibilities
and significant managerial power. They were also subordinated to the governor
general, who became the only intermediary between them and the central
government. But what made the reform truly revolutionary was the subsequent
reform of the central government. Most of the colleges and chanceries were closed,
their responsibilities transferred to and consolidated in the local chambers. By the
time the reform was completed in the mid-1780s, the imperial government had been
deprived of its executive agencies, and consisted only of the Senate, where the
procurator general exercised overwhelming influence, the college of war, and the
empress’s personal secretariat, where one of the secretaries, Alexander
Bezborodko, stood well above the others in the scope of his responsibilities. The
central government had become highly concentrated in the hands of a triumvirate
reporting directly to the empress. Governors general were directly responsible to
her, but reported to the Senate for most matters of civil administration (and even sat
in it when they came to the capital), and to the college of war in military affairs. The
reform had created a remarkable symmetry between the central and local levels,




But, as often happened in Russian administrative history, the reform was barely
completed when a major change was introduced. When the first list of governors
general was published in 1781, it turned out that they had been appointed, not in
each province but over two and sometimes three. The governor general resided in
one provincial capital and continued to be assisted by a governor, but in the other
provincial capital(s) the governor had become the top official: the governor general
had been transformed into a regional authority. By 1795, they numbered twenty
two. It is hard to determine what brought about this modification of the original
intent of the Organic Statute of November 1775. A shortage of generals was a





a rule lieutenant-generals, governors general, full generals, and in a few cases, even
field marshals. But it is more likely that, in fact, tradition reasserted itself. The
language of the time reinforces this interpretation: the governor was seen in the









How the reform would have developed had the empress been younger and the
triumvirate remained one of outstanding individuals must remain moot. A highly
concentrated government both at the center and in each provincial capital was an
 
16. See I. de Madariaga, 
 
Russia in the age of Catherine the Great 
 
(New Haven, l98l): 281-291
and J. LeDonne, 
 
Ruling Russia. Politics and administration in the age of absolutism 1762-1796
 
(Princeton, 1984): 67-82.











exceptional phenomenon in Russian administrative history. A considerable degree
of decentralization was achieved, especially in the administration of justice, and it
was most evident in the transfer of many local activities to elected bodies with some
decision-making powers, even though they were placed under strict gubernatorial
supervision. The major flaw of the reform was that it made the new system highly
dependent on so few individuals. Less than a decade after its completion the
empress was ageing, and the successors of Grigorii Potemkin and Prince Alexander
Viazemskii were men of lesser caliber. In spite of the decentralization, weakness at
the top reverberated through the entire system. As rot set in, a grand duke waited
impatiently in the wings, determined to do away with the decentralization of the
1780s and deconcentrate the central government once again: the model would be
the military establishment, with its several functional departments operating with
some autonomy under the overall supervision of the college of war and its
president.





governor general was their first victim, and with him, the concept of administrative
region was abandoned. Here was a paradox, because Paul developed the system of
inspectors in the army, accountable to the tsar alone for keeping military units up to
standard, and the deployment of troops was regionalized to a larger extent that had
been the case under Catherine. Paul recreated the colleges, but it was not clear what
their relationships would be with the provincial chambers. Governors were held
strictly accountable to the tsar, who remodelled the central government after the
military establishment while neglecting to extend the reform to the territorial
administration of civil affairs. It may have been assumed that re-centralization so
transformed the governor into a blind agent of the central government, dismissable
at the slightest suspicion of dereliction of duty, that no intermediate, regional,
authority was any longer necessary.
Paul’s reign lasted barely over four years, and his  impetuous and capricious
behavior was not conducive to the execution of a  consistent reform of the imperial
government. The tsar, nonetheless, pointed the  way to the future, and his son
followed the direction of his reforms. But  it was during the reign of Alexander I
that the most interesting experiment with regionalization would take place.
Dissatisfaction with Catherine’s reforms among the middle levels of the ruling
class and among the clerks who found themselves shipped off to the provinces; the
looming struggle with revolutionary France requiring a substantial increase in the
military establishment and the mobilization of resources to sustain that increase;
the re-emergence of an imperial family, increasingly separated from the great
families of the ruling elite and in need of a power base which it found in the army;
and the re-assertion of the autocratic power of the tsar-emperor — all these factors
combined to recreate a highly centralized and deconcentrated central government
not unlike that of Peter I, and one, interestingly enough, willing to experiment with
 
18. M. Klochkov, 
 
Ocherki pravitel’stvennoi deiatel’nosti vremeni Pavla I
 
 (Petrograd, 1916) is
still the standard study.
 




regional administration. It was as if the increasing size of the empire and extreme
centralization combined to require the creation of an intermediate level between the
imperial and provincial capitals — a need which Alexander’s successors would
refuse to concede.
Alexander retained his father’s emphasis on the reform of the central
government and his neglect of provincial administration. The reform of September
1802 created eight ministries by placing a minister at the head of the restored
colleges and giving him powers that infringed on collegial decision-making, the
hallmark of the old system. A second reform in June 1811 gave the minister
autocratic control of his ministry, and each minister would become the emperor’s




 The deconcentration of the
imperial government continued and, with the passage of time, that government
would become a conglomerate of ministries and “main administrations,” each with
its own selfish interests and little willingness to compromise in matters of imperial
interest. From Catherine II’s extreme form of concentration to Alexander’s (and his
successors’) extreme deconcentration the pendulum had swung very widely indeed.
Some attempt was made to coordinate ministerial activities and hold the ministers
to account — in the Senate’s First Department, in the Committee of Ministers, in
the State Council — but ministers and the emperor as commander in chief of both
the military and civilian establishments had a common interest in keeping open
direct channels of communication. The appointment of Alexei Arakcheev and
Prince Petr Volkonskii resurrected the posts of procurator general and president of
the college of war, and created for a while a duumvirate, but it could never possess
the exclusive power of Catherine’s triumvirate because the central government was
no longer concentrated as it had been under the empress.
The most telling consequence of the creation of the ministries was the
systematic splintering of all governmental activities into functional clusters and
their apportionment among the various ministries, not without some squabbling
over turf among the most powerful ministries with the widest competence. As a
result, it was logical that the Finance Ministry would claim control over the treasury
chambers, the Justice Ministry over the judicial chambers, the Interior Ministry
over the provincial board, although the ministry had to concede that the board
would remain under the Senate’s First Department, because its jurisdiction in
police matters and general administration overlapped with that of the chambers.
But what of the governor? He remained the tsar’s delegate, his divisional
commander in civil affairs, subordinated to the Senate. But the new consensus,
reflecting the key position of the ministers and their hunger for power, required that
the governor be placed under a minister who would be his intermediary with the
emperor and the Senate. Since the governor’s major responsibility was the
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inevitable consequence of this fragmentation of provincial administration along
functional lines, of its deconcentration, was to destroy the administrative unity
which Catherine’s reform had so successfully created. A new symmetry was
coming into being — a deconcentrated central government bearing down on a
deconcentrated provincial administration, to the detriment of responsible and
efficient government. Only a governor general could maintain a semblance of unity
and stem the evolution toward administrative anarchy.
There was no attempt to recreate officially the post of governor general as it had
existed between 1775 and 1796, and there was some reluctance to use even the title.
We find it in some frontier regions, like Siberia. Elsewhere, we find “military
governors” in command of the garrison in a major provincial capital, assisted by a





 In the Caucasus, he was called “commander in chief” and he did
command regular troops. Whatever the title, it is obvious that the governor general
re-emerged as an “inspector of civil administration” over more than one province,
responsible to the tsar directly, but also to the War Ministry for military affairs, to
the Interior Ministry for the police and the maintenance of order, to the other
ministries in matters of their respective concern. These “governors general” were
found in frontier regions alone and were not re-introduced in Russia proper.
The situation changed after 1814. That year, the field army returned to the
empire and was assigned permanent quarters. It received a quasi-regional
organization — divided into two armies, these divided into army corps. In regions
outside the area of deployment of the two armies “separate corps” were made





 It is most likely that this regionalization of the military
establishment renewed the debate over regionalizing the civil administration as
well. A number of projects were submitted and resulted in the creation by the end of
the reign of thirteen regions in both Russia proper and its borderlands, each headed




Two issues require separate investigation when we turn to the place of the governor
general in the hierarchy of government from ruler to governor. The first is the
governor general’s relationship with the central government. The Organic Statute
of 1775 emphasized that he was appointed by the empress at her discretion, but left
vague the nature of his relationship to her in the exercise of his duties. In urgent
cases, he was allowed to contact her directly. At other times, he was required to
submit periodic reports on his provinces which he had to inspect from time to time;
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elections to the provincial and district agencies; on the fiscal condition of his





 If such reports required action, the empress either issued a direct order
or referred the matter to the college of war or the Senate’s First Department for
further study. His role here was that of supplier of basic information on the overall
condition of his territory, so that the empress could in turn gather from the reports
of a relatively small number of regional delegates of the elite a fairly accurate
picture of the political, social, and economic life of her empire at any given time.
Beyond this purely procedural activity, gaining the ruler’s ear was not always easy:
any requests had to go through the hands of Bezborodko who, by adding a negative





A governor general also kept in touch with the Senate’s departments: the judicial
departments in his capacity as judicial officer in criminal cases, the First
Department in personnel and fiscal matters. Since the agenda of the departments
was tightly controlled by the procurator general and his chancery, the governor
general was in fact the regional delegate of the procurator general in civilian
matters and of the president of the college of war in military matters. His
dependence on the procurator general was greater because his post was a civilian
one, since governors general, if they had no military command, were transferred to




 Whenever there was a conflict of laws,
whenever the application of a law raised questions about its suitability in his
territory at a particular time, a governor general brought up the matter with Prince
Viazemskii who settled it either in consultation with the empress or by referring it
to the appropriate Senate department.
Moreover, a governor general was allowed to sit in a Senate department and the
general assembly when he obtained leave to come to Petersburg — it was granted
by the empress on the recommendation of the procurator general or that of her





territory if a case came up that affected its interests or those of some influential




 In these two types of activity — representing his
territory in the capital and speaking for it from his regional capital through the
procurator general — the governor general took part in law-making. The legislative










, vol. 20, 1775,
N. 14392.
23. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (RGADA), f. 16, d. 778, 1. 218
(Rehbinder to Bezborodko, Nov. 30, 1787); d. 804, part III,1. 146-147 (Tutolmin to
Bezborodko, July 28, 1788) and 1. 158ob (Tutolmin to same, Dec. 13, 1788).




, 15 (1910): 4-11, here 7: Prozorovskii
told the empress in 1781 he would accept his appointment as governor general of Kursk and
Orel on condition he would remain on the army list. He received no answer, and the following
year he was promoted to full general and removed from the list over his protest.















institution responsible for it, and the “law” took a multitude of forms, from a Senate





 Finally, a governor general was ultimately accountable to the Senate:
for serious dereliction of duty he would be tried in the general assembly of the





A second and more troublesome issue, but one that gives us a clue to the
contemporary perception of a governor general’s role, was that of his relationship
with the two or three governors in his region. The issue emerged immediately after
the publication of the Organic Statute. The Little Russian governor general,
Marshal Petr Rumiantsev, wanted to know the extent to which governors were
subordinated to him, what matters they could settle on their own authority, and
what others required his confirmation. The Senate could not find an answer in the
Statute but invoked the instructions to the governors of 1728 and 1764. Governors,




 were considered to be on equal footing
among themselves, in accordance with an old tradition that did not accept
gradations of authority between the center and the districts. The difference was only
in rank and status, not in managerial power. The instruction of 1764 had placed the




) of the empress and Senate alone (and no




) only from them. There
was a precedent, however. When eastern Bielorussia was annexed in 1772, the two
governors were placed under the authority of the governor general, Zakhar
Chernyshev, the vice-president of the college of war. It was suggested that this
precedent be used to clarify the issue, but Catherine insisted that Rumiantsev must
proceed in accordance with the Organic Statute — a non sequitur since neither he




Nevertheless, the issue had to be faced after 1781, when it became clear that the
post of governor general was evolving quite differently from what had be intended
by the Statute. The governor general was no longer a provincial official but had
become a regional one. A general decision was never published, but practice settled
the issue. The governor was indeed subordinated to the governor general and had to
report to the Senate through his office. Rumiantsev, Chernyshev and Potemkin
were field marshals; other governors general were either lieutenant or full generals.
As a rule, governors were major generals. In the command hierarchy in which these
men had spent their entire career, they knew they had to obey their superior
officers. Chernyshev treated one of his governors so rudely that the latter asked the
empress to return him to active service; using improper (
 
neprilichnyi) language in a
26. On this broad and complicated question see N. Korkunov, Ukaz i zakon (Petersburg, 1894).
27. I know of only one governor general (Ivan Iakobi of Irkutsk who was dismissed for a
serious offense, here an alleged plot to involve Russia into war with China: see Istoriia
Pravitel’stvuiushchogo Senata (SPb, 1911), 5 vol., here 2: 345-346, 496, 587-588, 791, and
“Zapiski Derzhavina,” in  Iu. Grot, ed., Sochineniia Derzhavina (SPb, 1868-1878), 7 vol., here
6 (1871): 633-643. There was no formal trial and the case was eventually dismissed.
28. PSZ, vol. 16, 1764, N. 12137, vol. 20, 1775, N. 14394.
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letter to one’s governor general was equated with lack of respect for one’s
commander (nachaln’ik), to whom the governor was “subordinated,” and in this
case resulted in removal from office and trial in the Senate’s Sixth Department. But
of course, governors and governors general were political managers, not
bureaucrats, and their mutual relationships were very much influenced by their
political connections in the elite of the capital. Governor Afanasii Zubov in Kursk
sought to undermine his superior, Governor General Alexander Prozorovskii, by
sending derogatory information to the procurator general. Gavril Derzhavin,
annoyed at Governor General Ivan Gudovich’s attitude toward him, turned to
Potemkin to get himself transferred to a less troublesome post.29 However, it had
become an established principle by the mid-1780s that governors were
subordinated to their governor general.
Yet, a certain ambivalence remained. A governor general usually resided
permanently in one of the provincial capitals. There, he was the chairman of the
provincial board, and the governor was merely his deputy. But what of the governor
in the other provincial capital? Here, tradition remained very much alive. Thus, a
Senate order of November 1775 instructed governors general and governors, “each
in his province,” to send descriptions of roads and the location of river crossings to
facilitate the march of regiments from one assignment to another. An imperial order
of August 1782 declared that if a governor resided in a provincial capital that was
closer to Petersburg or Moscow than the residence of the governor general, he was
to send his reports to the empress directly, bypassing the governor general’s office.
Such language was reminiscent of the 1730s and showed that in the eyes of some
members of the ruling elite at least, the governor general was the successor of the
governor and the governor that of the sub-provincial voevoda.
Even more indicative of the reluctance to establish a strict and uniform
subordination of the governor to the governor general and thereby recognize the
existence of a regional level was the answer given to the question of what happened
when a governor general was absent from his two provinces. The Organic Statute
provided that, when the governor general was absent, the governor would operate
in accordance with the instruction of April 1764 and other appropriate regulations.
As early as 1782, it was decided that in such a case the governor would send the bi-
monthly reports on the condition of his province. Later, it became a general rule
that whenever an order was sent to carry out a certain assignment in the province,
the governor general “or in his absence the governor” would be responsible for it.30
This raised a fundamental question. If the responsibilities of a governor general and
29. G. Dobrynin, “Istinnoe povestvovanie ili zhizn’ Gavrila Ivanovicha Dobrynina im samim
pisannaia (1762-1827),” Russkaia starina, II(July-Dec. 1871): 97-153, here 108; PSZ, vol. 22,
1786, N. 16456; RGADA, f. 248, kn. 6560, vol. 1, 193-196 (Prozorovskii to procurator general,
Nov. 13, 1783); on Derzhavin, see E. Salias, “Poet Derzhavin, pravitel’ Namestnichestva 1785-
1788,” Russkii arkhiv (Sept. 1786): 66-120, (Oct. 1786): 567-627, and “Zapiski Derzhavina,”
art. cit., 526-528.
30. See for example, PSZ, vol. 21, 1781, N. 15141, vol. 22, 1788, N. 16736, vol. 23, 1794,
N. 17194.
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a governor were interchangeable, was not the governor general becoming
superfluous and the administrative region an unwanted child of the reform? The
question was all the more relevant: since the governor general did not have his own
separate chancery, there existed in fact no regional authority.31
Turning now to the actual managerial powers of a governor general, we may
begin with his powers over personnel. The clerical personnel (copyists and
kantseliaristy) were appointed by the provincial board at discretion from local
people — sons of priests, sons of merchants, even people subject to the capitation,
although this was frowned upon if not illegal. The secretaries were, as a rule,
appointed by the Senate’s First Department from a pool of candidates in the capital,
but it was by no means unusual that the Senate would simply accept a
recommendation of the governor general.32 Each province had a board, two judicial
chambers, and a treasury chamber for a total of 5 secretaries in grade 11, the civilian
equivalent of a second lieutenant, and the two elected courts had 3 secretaries in
grade 12, a total of 8. At the district level, the land court and the district court had
each a secretary in grade 14, the last level in the Table of Ranks. If we assume an
average of 12 districts per province, this meant 24 secretaries, a grand total of 32.33
All of them depended on a Senate appointment, which meant they could not be
dismissed without Senate approval.
The managerial personnel consisted of appointed and elected officials. The
board and the three chambers were entirely appointed and had a personnel of 18, all
chosen by the Senate except the three chairmen who were appointed by the ruler.
The two chairmen of the upper land court were also appointed by the ruler, those of
the magistrat and the upper rasprava by the Senate, on the recommendation of the
provincial board. Their other members were elected, but the election required the
confirmation of the governor general “or, in his absence, the governor.” The district
and land courts were entirely elected, but their election required similar
confirmation. Thus, neither the governor general nor the governor had any
appointive powers except over subordinate clerical personnel outside the Table of
Ranks.34 They could recommend personnel in some cases, and it seems they were
allowed to bring their own people with them to fill a number of posts.35 Moreover,
their power to confirm elections gave them influence over the elected personnel,
but they had no immediate and formal power to appoint and dismiss.
31. I. Strakhovskii, “Gubernskoe ustroistvo,” Zhurnal ministerstva iustitsii, 7 (1913): 28-92,
here 53. But governors general lived in grand style: see for example, I. Meshkov, “Zapiski Ivan
Ivanovich Meshkova 1767-1832,” Russkii arkhiv, II, 5-8 (1905): 177-242, here 187;
G. Dobrynin, art cit., I(Jan.-June 1871): 651-672, here 665, II(July-Dec. 1871): 97-153, here
139-140, 177-222, here 207.
32. See RGADA, f. 248, d. 6519, part 2, 65-67 (Mel’gunov to procurator general, July 8, 1783).
33. These data come from the general table of organization of the postreform agencies in PSZ,
vol. 44, part 2, shtaty po grazhdanskoi chasti, 1796, N. 17494 (pp. 253-268).
34. PSZ, vol. 21, 1781, N. 15193 and 15141, art 23.
35. RGADA, f. 248, d. 6560, part I, 52 (Prozorvoskii to procurator general, February 8, 1783),
59-60 (Ibid., April 6, 1783).
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In police matters, the governor general played a crucial role. The 12 land captains
were responsible to the board for the maintenance of order, the conduct of
investigations and the execution of judicial decisions as well as those of the treasury
chamber. If the land captain’s presence was not enough to restore order, the
governor general could place at his disposal men from the shtatnaia komanda
stationed in the provincial and district capitals. If additional force was needed, resort
would be had to the garrison — if there was one in the province. All commandants
were subordinated to the governor general and expected to carry out his orders (pod
orderom). And in extraordinary cases, when the use of force by regular troops was
required, requests were sent to the college of war and the empress herself, unless the
governor general was a military commander.36 Therefore, a governor general (and a
governor) had a monopoly over the use of force, and this considerably strengthened
his authority. He was first and foremost a police official.
His monopoly of force was backed by the confirmation of criminal sentences.
Some of his powers were specific, others more general. Criminal chambers were
empowered to impose a variety of penalties, but sentences to death, “loss of honor,”
and severe corporal punishment required the approval of the governor general.
Since the application of the death penalty had been suspended, it was implied that
the governor general either forwarded death sentences to the Senate or commuted
them to severe corporal punishment and banishment to Siberia. The interposition of
the governor general in criminal procedure was important, because it was generally
recognized that the penal law was too harsh, and courts had no choice but to apply it
to the letter. Rather than amend it to soften its provisions, it was considered
profitable to let the governor general mitigate the law in the name of a more humane
justice by referring to Catherine’s own merciful disposition. In Russia, the law was
harsh, but the ruler (and her regional delegate) were merciful: that was one of the
foundations of the autocratic power. Since the instruction of 1764 said nothing
about the governor’s judicial powers, the governor inherited those of the governor
general when the latter was away. The governor general did not formally interfere
in civil procedure: if the value of the suit was under 500 rubles, it was decided by
the civil chamber in last resort; if it exceeded 500 rubles, the case was automatically
forwarded to the Senate if one of the parties chose to appeal.37
Although the Organic Statute clearly stated that the governor general was no
judge, it also gave him broad jurisdiction to ensure that “justice” (spravedlivost’)
would be done. If he noticed something “unjust” in the administration of justice, he
could stop it but had to report this to the Senate and even the empress herself. This
provision gave him in fact the power to interfere in both civil and criminal
procedure. Although Catherine wanted to separate the judiciary from the regular
administration and give it substantial autonomy, it was also quite clear there could
be no independence. While one governor general could do much good in
36. PSZ, vol. 20, 1780, N. 14990. For an example of such a request (denied) see RGADA, f. 16,
d. 804, 253-254 (Tutolmin to Catherine II, August 8, 1785).
37. J. LeDonne, Absolutism..., op. cit.: 196-197.
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humanizing criminal justice, another could do much harm by giving his personal
interpretation of what was just. Personal and arbitrary power very much remained a
major factor in the judicial system.
A governor general had no powers in fiscal administration. He could not raise or
reduce taxes or introduce new ones. The rate of the capitation and quitrent was
fixed by imperial legislation, the receipts were deposited in the provincial treasury
and were spent pursuant to orders from the central treasury administered by the
procurator general. Expenditures were set by tables of organization (shtaty), and
any additional expenditures required the ruler’s approval, like any other
amendments to the “laws.” Governors general had no power to change any of the
sources of revenue, but could submit recommendations, together with those of the
treasury chamber, to the  Senate’s First Department for decision. However, they
had greater freedom of action in demanding the so-called contributions from the
land (zemskie povinnosti): supplying carts for the transportation of officials and
troops, repairing roads, billeting troops. Since the amount of these contributions
was not fixed until 1803, there was great latitude for the exercise of arbitrary power,
requiring peasants to leave their fields in summertime, for example.38
But if the governor general had such limited fiscal powers, he  was given broad
responsibility for the economic well-being of his  provinces: he had to prevent
shortages of salt and other necessities of life,  encourage agriculture and industry,
keep roads in good order, protect forests, look after the poor, encourage the
building of schools. He had to stimulate the production of vodka because its sale
was a state monopoly, and a lucrative one. Governors general were empowered to
negotiate contracts for up to 10,000 rubles, which had been a college’s power
before the reform. As a rule, the new provincial agencies were equated with the pre-
reform central agencies whose functions were decentralized and central
headquarters closed. The governor general had become a kind of regional
procurator general with an overall jurisdiction over the entire public and economic
life of his two provinces. He was, like the governor before and after him, the
“master”(khoziain) of his “region.”
The term, however, was misleading. Responsibility without effective power did
not encourage initiative, as Governor-General Jakob Sievers found out to his
chagrin in the administration of Novgorod and Tver provinces: an enterprising
governor general, he found himself constantly at odds with the powerful procurator
general who expected a more restrained performance from his regional delegate.39
Any initiative was bound to involve the expenditure of funds, and the governor
38. Ibid.: 272-275.
39. R. Jones, Provincial development in Russia (New Brunswick, 1984): 55-56, 159-169.
Gradovskii certainly exaggerates when he writes that Catherine’s governors general were “a
law unto themselves” who “dealt among themselves as semi-sovereign lords” but he had a
point: they were members of the ruling elite and as such behaved in the same autocratic manner
as their own imperial mistress: “Istoricheskii ocherk...,” art. cit.: 312-313. For a valuable
description of a governor general’s activities see L. Trefolev, “A.P. Mel’gunov, general
gubernator Ekaterinskikh vremen,” Russkii arkhiv (1865): 931-978.
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general was condemned to beg for them or get into trouble for juggling accounts.
What kind of role, then, was a governor general actually expected to play behind
the imposing facade of the Organic Statute?
He was first of all responsible for the maintenance of order and, if he was given a
military command as well, he was also responsible for the security of the imperial
boundary in his region. In exceptional cases, he might also command troops in
wartime. In this capacity, his chief allegiance was to the college of war and to the
empress herself. In two cases, a governor general was also the president of that
college (Chernyshev in Bielorussia and Potemkin in New Russia). He stood higher
in the official hierarchy than a mere governor, and was often a member of the great
families of the elite while governors had risen through the ranks, sometimes from
very modest backgrounds.  The governor general thus projected the image of the
Court in the provinces of the empire, gave the provincial nobility a sense of
solidarity with the empress. Internal security was achieved not only by maintaining
order but also by creating patronage networks in the provinces and integrating them
into a vast imperial network.40 Some 20 well-known military commanders and
members of the ruling elite could much better do this than some 50 governors.
But with the passage of time it became clear that the post of governor general in
the central provinces of the Russian core was becoming a temporary one.
Sometimes the post was left vacant; sometimes it was filled by a general who had
run afoul of another powerful member of the elite. When the post was vacant, the
governor became the true “master” of his province and with similar powers. 
As a result, it gradually became an inspectorial one, in which the governor
general did not so much manage his region as inspect its agencies to make sure they
operated in accordance with the Organic Statute and other regulations. The
requirement that he inspect his territory regularly, visit the agencies, check their
procedures and books, verify the holdings of the treasury, and report to the central
government whatever changes he felt necessary, bears a strong resemblance to the
statute of 1731 on the inspector general of the army and his three roving
inspectors.41 By the end of Catherine’s reign, these dual aspects of the post of
governor general — real manager in some cases, mere inspector in others — had
become the characteristic features of the post.
III
Alexander’s government rejected from the very beginning the principles upon
which the reform of the 1770s had rested: there would be a return to deconcentrated
40. Gavril Dobrynin who served in Bielorussia writes that governors general were powerful
because they were close to the ruler (v doverie tsarskoe), which is another way of saying that
they belonged to the ruling elite of which the empress was the grand patron: art. cit.: 322.
Although some of them had fallen from favor, they remained members of the elite.
41. PSZ, vol. 8, 1731, N. 5900. In a 1790 case, the governor general is referred to as the keeper
(bliustitel’) of the laws: PSZ, vol. 23, 1790, N. 16861.
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government, presumably unified under the leadership of the tsar-emperor and
“autocrat,” and the provincial administration would similarly be deconcentrated by
diluting the responsibilities of the governor. The result would be a re-centralization
of decision-making in the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Justice, and Education.
There would be no room for governors general as intermediaries between
ministries and provincial agencies, except in border regions where political
considerations required the maintenance of some kind of regional administration.
The manifesto of September 1802 announcing the creation of ministries
contained an essential contradiction.42 It pointed out the variety of climates,
peoples, religions, and ways of life and languages in the empire  — in a word
recognized its regional diversity. The purpose of government was to remove, nay
prevent, abuses, develop agriculture and encourage manufactures. Such a truly
regional perspective on the geography, ethnicity, and economy of the empire
seemed to announce the creation of agencies adapted to it. Instead, the manifesto
invoked the legacy (dukh) of Peter I, who had divided the administration into
sectors (chasti) managed by agencies with a functional jurisdiction restricted to a
number of related matters and extending across the entire breadth of the empire. It
conveniently overlooked Peter ’s experiment with regionalization between 1708
and 1719. Although not designed to bring out the internal diversity of the realm but
aimed chiefly at facilitating the collection of taxes and the drafting of recruits, that
experiment had nevertheless laid the foundation of what might have become a
regional administration, to which Catherine did return in part and to which
Alexander would also return toward the end of his reign.
The ministries of 1802 were loose collections of old colleges that had been
restored by Paul, and the authority of a minister was by no means clear. It was
certainly limited by the “collegial” way of doing business. Such practices were
becoming obsolete in a political world imbued with the determination to carry out
extensive reforms where each minister, selected by the tsar and enjoying his
confidence, saw himself as his “chief of staff” in a specific domain.43  The spirit of
Catherine’s government had been clearly civilian, that of Alexander’s was military,
and ministers were civilian commanders responsible to the tsar as commander in
chief of both the military and civilian establishments. Their authority and power
were considerably enhanced by the ministerial statute of June 1811, published at a
time when war with France seemed imminent.44 The internal structure of each
ministry was streamlined, the colleges were abolished and transformed into
departments headed by a director subordinated to the minister. Ministers were freed
from whatever control remained over their activities: there was something
unacceptable about the control by any agency of government, the Senate for
42. PSZ, vol. 27, 1802, N. 20406.; A. Gradovskii, “Vysshaia...,” art. cit.:  287-290.
43. S. Pokrovskii, op. cit.: 158-162. For some valuable comments on the emergence of
functions in science at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the classical period had
emphasized coordination and integration, see F. Jacob, La logique du vivant (Paris, 1970): 43-
44, 53, 100-101, 121, 125, 201.
44. PSZ, vol. 31, 1811, N. 24686.
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example, of the activities of a minister whose primary function was to carry out the
emperor’s orders.45 The reverse of the coin, however, was that the emperor had
neither the time nor the patience and capacity to enforce unity in a government
which became more and more deconcentrated with the passage of time;
contemporaries would henceforth bemoan the lack of unity until the Revolution of
1905. Each ministry became a functional empire within the territorial empire and
each minister began to consider his ministry a kind of fiefdom.46 It is obvious that
he would look at any governor general as a potential enemy.
The 1811 statute dealt with ministries in general and set the norms for statutes
issued for individual ministries.47 It had to take up the relationships with local
agencies but it did this in a very ambiguous way. It stated that agencies and persons
subordinated to the ministry must carry out its orders unconditionally
(bezprikoslovno), and these agencies had to include local ones. Ministers were
given the authority to dismiss officials appointed by the Senate and promote others
to grade seven, previously a Senate responsibility. Thus the personnel of the
judicial chambers and treasury chamber became dependent on the Justice and
Finance Ministers respectively, while the governor became the agent of the Interior
Minister, although he also remained the personal agent of the emperor. Some
semblance of “unity” was preserved by insisting that the provincial board was
appointed by the Senate. The only reference to the governor was that if a ministerial
order depended on the board for its execution, it had to be addressed to the governor
in person. The implication was that orders dealing with the chambers’ activities that
did not need the assistance of the board were addressed to the chambers directly.
And the only reference to a regional agent was that no ministerial order could be
sent to a local agency “bypassing or ignoring” a higher authority. A copy of the
order would presumably be sent to that agent.48  There was much ambiguity in these
provisions, probably evidence of a compromise between the supporters of
unlimited ministerial power and those who remained faithful to the essence of
Catherine’s reforms. But the trend was clear.
The issue of regionalism could not be ignored, however, and it was treated in
two ways. One was to create ministerial regions, i.e., multi-provincial territories in
45. S. Pokrovskii, op. cit.: 59-61; J. LeDonne, Absolutism..., op. cit.: 108-112.
46. J. LeDonne, Absolutism..., op. cit.: 107-108; A. Gradovskii, “Vysshaia...,”  art. cit.:  291-
292.
47. The statute of the Police Ministry (created in 1810 to take over many of the functions of the
Interior Ministry and abolished in 1819) is in PSZ, vol. 31, 1811, N. 24687, that of the Finance
Ministry in ibid., N. 24688, that of the Education Ministry in vol. 34, 1817, N. 27106. No
statute was published for the Justice Ministry which remained very much part of the Senate
establishment.
48. PSZ, vol. 31, 1811, N. 24686, art. 234-236, 269-271. See also O. Zakharova, Generaly
svoikh sudeb (Moscow, 1988): 17 and S. Seredonin, ed., Istoricheskii obzor deiatel’nosti
komiteta ministrov  (SPb, 1902-1903), 5 vol., here 1: 464. Governors (and governors general)
retained the power to confirm contracts up to the value of 10,000 rubles, unless authorized to
confirm them above that sum by imperial orders. This ceiling was raised to 25,000 in 1830.
Contracts valued at between 25,000 and 50,000 rubles were confirmed by individual ministers,
those above by the Senate.
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which a specific sector of administration was placed under the supervision of the
regional delegate of an individual minister. This was very different from the
integrated, “concentrated,” territorial administration placed under the
representative of the central government with a broad jurisdiction over at least
several sectors of administration. This deserves separate treatment. The other way
was to admit exceptions to the rule that there must be no regional intermediary
between the central government and the provincial administration while
postulating that the exceptions would apply only to the frontier regions: there,
governors general would be called military governors and would be stationed in
Riga, Vitebsk, Vilno, Kiev, Poltava and Odessa, Tiflis, Orenburg and Irkutsk. They
would wear two hats: as military officers of general rank, they would command the
garrisons; as civilian members of the elite, they would have supervisor authority
over two or three civil governors and would be inspectors of the civil
administration; they would receive a copy of ministerial orders sent to the
governors, and governors would forward their recommendations and confirmations
of criminal sentences through their offices or would file copies with them. In
Orenburg, the military governor would command the regular and irregular troops
stationed in his territory; in Tiflis he would be called commander in chief because
he was a theater commander in the entire Caucasus. In these two cases, the
“governor general” as military commander possessed greater powers over his
military subordinates than he did over the civilian ones. His status as separate corps
commander empowered him to order a court martial over any officer up to the rank
of general and to confirm sentences except those to death and degradation up to the
rank of lieutenant colonel.49
Siberia was a world in itself, and it was there that the major exception was made
from the very beginning of the reign. Indeed, only there was the title of governor
general officially used. The governor general of Tobolsk and Irkutsk (and of Tomsk
beginning in 1804) was given an instruction in May 1803 which was understood to
be a supplement to the Organic Statute of November 1775.50 It was justified by the
enormous distances and the inability of the government in Petersburg to take
appropriate action when urgently needed and control Siberian officials who, it was
well known, were notoriously corrupt. The governor general was of course
subordinated to the tsar directly, and the two civil governors were subordinated to
him. So were the functional sectors like the administration of mines, the post office,
even the regular troops. Although the day-to-day administration of the Siberian
Lines remained the responsibility of their commander in Omsk, the provisioning of
troops, their deployment and their relations with the population were vested in the
governor general as commander of all land forces in Siberia and naval forces on the
Sea of Okhotsk. Since the ministries had not yet extended their tentacles to Siberia,
he  appointed all officials there except the governors, the chairmen of the three
chambers and those in command of sectorial administration, and he was
49. PSZ, vol. 33, 1815, N. 26022, art. 16-17.
50. PSZ, vol. 27, 1803, N. 20771.
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empowered to remove and transfer those he considered unfit and hand them over to
trial in the  criminal chamber. But sentences had to be forwarded to the Senate.
Moreover, he was also empowered to confirm contracts valued at more than
10,000 rubles.
Thus the instruction created a truly regional authority, to be based in Irkutsk,
although the governor general was authorized to move to Tobolsk and stay there for
as long as he needed. It set aside Siberia from European Russia, but hardly
produced a solution to the problems of that vast borderland. The region was too
large, the distances too great between Tobolsk and Irkutsk (not to mention Iakutsk)
to enable the governor general to get acquainted with its personnel and its needs. In
fact, it was a throwback to the pre-reform period, even to the pre-1764 period, when
the governor of Siberia also possessed great powers and the commander of the
Siberian Lines reported to him. For the next fifteen years, Siberia was left to its own
devices, and one of the governors general even chose not to live there but to remain
in Petersburg, throwing the regional administration even farther back, to the
seventeenth century, when the Siberian chancery had administered the area from
Moscow.
Abuses multiplied and the return of peace in 1815 enabled the government to
focus once again on tasks of internal administration. The reform of the Siberian
administration was the work of Mikhail Speranskii and was embodied in a series of
documents published in 1822.51 Siberia was divided into two regions, with a
governor general in Tobolsk (later Omsk) and another in Irkutsk. The governor
genera1 of Tobolsk was also the commander of the Siberian Separate Corps
consisting of irregular troops and garrisons on the line, but the commandants of
Eastern Siberia depended on Irkutsk. The military responsibilities of these two
governors general were thus more limited than those of the governor general under
the 1803 instruction.
The most original feature of the reform was the creation of a regional council
(sovet) in each city, It consisted of six members appointed by the emperor, three on
the recommendation of the governor general to handle the paperwork and draw up
the agenda (proizvoditeli del), the other three on the recommendation of the
Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Justice. Other regional agents
(communications, internal guard, post office) and members of the provincial
administration would also be invited when their expertise and cooperation were
needed. The council thus brought together in one regional agency delegates of the
three ministries who elsewhere operated on their own, but it was given no executive
powers and functioned only as an advisory body: the governor general was
empowered to ignore even its unanimous opinion.
Each “main administration” — the name of the regional agency — was
subordinated to the Senate and declared to be “a ministerial agency operating
locally” in accordance with Speranskii’s curious confusion between sectorial
51. The classic work on the reform is M. Raeff, Siberia and the reforms of 1822 (Seattle, 1956).
The major document is PSZ, vol. 38. 1822, N. 29125.
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(functional) and territorial administration.52 The ministerial system had so
mesmerized its creator that everything had to be fitted into it, even incompatible
and contradictory concepts. In fact, the main administration was subordinated to a
“Siberian Committee,” a kind of restricted committee consisting of the Ministers of
Interior, Finance, Education, the state comptroller, Speranskii, and Alexei
Arakcheev, who functioned as a de facto prime minister. The committee’s minutes
were submitted to the emperor for his confirmation. Governors and provincial
agencies received their orders from the Senate and the relevant ministry but a copy
had to be sent to the governor general, and civil governors were not allowed to
bypass him when they sought a ministerial authorization. On the other hand, all key
personnel in the provincial agencies were appointed by the relevant minister or by
the emperor on his recommendation, and the rules to dismiss and commit to trial
were also determined by the relevant ministry. The main administration had no
funds at its disposal and therefore no budget, but was empowered to negotiate
contracts valued at between 10,000 and 40,000 rubles. In criminal cases, governors
had to seek the Senate’s confirmation of their sentences to death and the knout. In
other cases, if they disagreed with the sentences of the provincial courts the case
was sent to the main administration for final decision by majority vote confirmed
by the governor general.53
In the meantime, between 1803 and 1822, other attempts had been made to
create regional agencies elsewhere in the empire. Russia annexed Finland in 1809
and a governor general was appointed in Helsingfors (Helsinki), the regional repre-
sentative of the Russian emperor as Grand Duke of Finland. He commanded
Russian troops in the territory and, after 1815, the so-called Finland Separate
Corps. In 1823, he moved his residence to Petersburg. Much of his business with
the emperor was handled by Speranskii in his capacity as private secretary for
Finnish affairs and, beginning in 1811, by a committee of Finnish officials chaired
by its own secretary. Finland was governed by a council created in 1809 and
renamed a Senate in 1816, consisting of Finnish members appointed by the
emperor. Two of its departments administered the court system and acted as a
supreme court; another eight functioned as the civil administration of the land.54
Although the Senate was chaired by the governor general, his influence was not
determinant, in part because it was government policy to give the Finns the widest
possible autonomy, in part because the Finns had a representative in the inner
sanctum of power who had direct access to the emperor. However, the departments
had no connection with the ministries in Petersburg. Once he had moved to the
imperial capital, the governor general no longer even chaired the Senate. He would
52. Ibid., art. 582.
53. Ibid., art. 20, 533.
54. K. Ordyn, Pokorenie Finliandii (SPb, 1869) 2 vol., here 2: 283-285; “Dokumenty,
otnosiashchiesia do voiny s Shvetsieiu i do prisoenineniia Finliandii 1809-1815gg,” Sbornik
istoricheskikh materialov, 3 (1890), 247-328, here 267-269, 288-290; D. Kirby, The Baltic
world, 1772-1993. Europe’s northern periphery in an age of change (London, 1995): 80;
E. Thaden, Russia’s western borderlands, 1710-1870 (Princeton, 1984): 92-93.
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remain an essentially military commander responsible for the internal security of
the territory and, beginning in 1831, would also be chief of staff of the Navy:
Russia’s interest in Finland was inseparable from its naval activities in the Gulf of
Finland and the overall command of the Baltic Fleet.
Another type of regional agency was created in Poland following the annexation
of most of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1815. The territory was declared a tsarstvo with
the Russian emperor as tsar of Poland. He was represented in Warsaw by a viceroy
(namestnik) who was a Polish general with a questionable political past from the
Russian point of view.55 The tsarstvo was governed by a constitutional charter
which established governmental agencies and guaranteed certain freedoms that
were not granted to other inhabitants of the empire. There were five Polish
Ministers (War, Police, Justice, Finance, and Education) who sat in a committee
called the State Council chaired by the  viceroy. These ministers had no contacts
with their imperial counterparts, giving  Poland, like Finland, a considerable
amount of internal autonomy. Poland also had a parliament elected by the
population of the tsarstvo, which met (unlike the Finnish diet which never met after
1809) in 1818, 1820 and 1825. The territory was represented in Petersburg by a
secretary, after 1821 called minister-state secretary, with direct access to the
emperor.56 At first glance, there was great similarity between the regional agencies
in Helsinki and those in Warsaw. But the similarity was misleading. There was
considerable ambivalence in Petersburg about how much Polish autonomy was
acceptable, and the Polish question was inextricably linked with that of the marches
of the former Polish empire: Bielorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine,
where military governors had been appointed in Vitebsk, Vilno, Kamenets-Podolsk
and Kiev. Their authority and powers were regulated by the Organic Statute of
1775 and their status as military governor.
While the State Council was chaired by the Polish viceroy, its most influential
member was the Russian Imperial Commissioner (Nikolai Novosil’tsev), whose
post was not even mentioned in the charter, and who was not exceedingly friendly
toward Polish autonomy because he saw Poland as a hotbed of subversion.
Moreover, the most powerful representative of the ruling elite in Warsaw was Grand
Duke Constantine, the tsar’s brother, who commanded the Polish army and the so-
called Lithuanian Separate Corps stationed in Lithuania and the western Ukraine. In
1822, Constantine was given the powers of a commander in chief in wartime: in
accordance with the statute of 1812 on the administration of the Grand “Active”
Army, all civil and military authorities in the area of the army’s deployment were
55. Józef Zającek (1752-1826) had served in Kościuszko’s army and had commanded an
infantry division in Napoleon’s army during the invasion of 1812: P. Maikop, “Tsarstvo
Pol’skoe posle Venskogo kongressa,” Russkaia starina, 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1902): 183-194, here 192-
193.
56. The charter was published in Dnevnik zakonov tsarstva pol’skogo (Warsaw, 1810-1871), 1:
2-103. See also E. Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands von Peter dem
Grossen bis 1917 (Leiden, 1966): 424-427, and P. Maikop, art. cit.: 193-194 and ibid.,  l (Jan.-
March 1903): 419-436, here 419-422.
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subordinated to him.57 The effect was to create a super-region including Poland,
Lithuania, and part of the Right-Bank Ukraine, where governors and provincial
agencies reported to a de facto super-governor general, the intermediary between the
imperial agencies in Petersburg, the governor general of Lithuania (as military
governor of Vilno) and the civil-military agencies on the right bank.
These examples show that a very large part of the Russian empire was governed
by governors general whose powers differed significantly from one region to
another, while in still other regions (Bielorussia, Little Russia, New Russia, and the
Caucasus) governors general operated chiefly in accordance with the Organic Statute
of 1775. Only Russia proper did not have its regional agents: the governors general
of Petersburg and Moscow were essentially provincial agents of high status in the
two capitals. A major influence on the government’s thinking toward the institution
of governor general was the territorial reorganization of the army in 1814-1815. It
created two armies each commanded by a commander in chief headquartered in
Mogilev in Bielorussia and Tulchin in Podolia, each divided into army corps
consisting of a number of divisions and regiments deployed in a group of provinces.
In certain frontier regions, these military-territorial formations were called separate
corps. The reorganization was followed by the submission of a number of projects
discussing the virtues and faults and dangers of regional administration. These will
be discussed in a separate article. What is important for our purpose here is that a
decision was made in 1824 to appoint governors general everywhere, in both Russia
proper and its frontier territories. A list was drawn up of 13 governors general, each
with a jurisdiction over from 2 to 5 provinces.58 There would be 4 in Russia proper,
1 in the Baltic region, 3 in the former Polish marches, 1 in New Russia, 1 in the
Caucasus, 1 in Orenburg, and 2 in Siberia. In three cases their jurisdiction included
both Russian and non-Russian provinces: Pskov was linked with the Baltic region,
Kaluga and Smolensk with Bielorussia, Viatka and Perm with Orenburg. Finland and
Poland were not included. By 1825, 12 of the 13 had already been appointed: in
Riazan, Arkhangelsk, Kazan, Riga, Vitebsk, Vilno, Poltava, Odessa, Tiflis,
Orenburg, Tobolsk, and Irkutsk. What remained unclear was the extent of their
powers and how such different territories would be administered by a single-type
regional delegate. There was no time to draw up an instruction: after Alexander’s
death, the so-called Committee of December 6, 1826, which carried out a thorough
re-evaluation of the imperial administration, concluded that governors general must
be appointed only in the border regions. The experiment begun in 1781 with
regionalization on an empire-wide scale had come to an end.
*
57. PSZ, vol. 38, 1822, N. 29087 and 29088. For the background of the decision see A. Pienkos,
Grand Duke Constantine Petrovich. A study in early nineteenth-century Russo-Polish relations
1815-1831, unpub. Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971: 104-109.
58. PSZ, vol. 40, 1825, N. 30516. The list actually includes 15 governors general but two of
them, Petersburg and Moscow, were not regional delegates since their jurisdiction did not
extend beyond one province.
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Regionalization never received pride of place in Russian administrative practice. It
was always assumed that central agencies must retain direct links with their agents
in the field, be they the simple voevoda in the seventeenth century, the sub-
provincial voevoda after 1719, the provincial governor after 1775, the judicial and
fiscal chambers after 1811. As a result, it was taken for granted that regional
administration could not be territorial in the full sense of the term, could not be
general while also concentrated in a single official, but had to be primarily
functional: the chiefs of various provincial sectors operated not as the subordinate
agents of that official, but as local representatives of a central agency responsible
for a definite sector of administration across the entire territory of the empire. There
is everywhere a basic antagonism between area and functional administration, even
in a modern navy, between a captain and the service chiefs on board his ship. In
Russia, the service chiefs in the capital always won, because they were members of
the ruling elite for whom the purpose of governance was the sharing of the spoils,
each getting his share, which the Romanov house apportioned among them. The
only example of truly territorial administration was Catherine’s reforms, which
lasted only about a decade before they were reversed by her son. An explanation
must be found in cultural factors59 and the strongly anti-bureaucratic and
aristocratic spirit of the age, which inspired the closing of the central agencies with
their large numbers of socially inferior clerks, leaving a triumvirate of highly
competent individuals working closely with the empress, and relying on the
governors general to manage the empire for them.
Where did governors general fit in as regional agents over two or more
provinces? The answer is complicated, because a number of factors  must be taken
into account. One was the sheer size of the empire and its growing diversity. The
Organic Statute took effect after the first partition of Poland and the treaty of
Kuchuk Kainarji, and by the time the governors general became regional agents, in
1781 — and no longer provincial ones as originally intended — Russia was about
to annex the Crimea and sign a treaty with Erakle of eastern Georgia. The larger the
empire, the greater the diversity of managerial responsibilities, and of course, the
greater the number of provinces: by 1796 there were already 50. Moreover, these
provinces were themselves the result of a partitioning of natural and historical
regions — the eastern marches of the Polish empire, the southern steppe — which
retained much of their old unity despite the new administrative-territorial
fragmentation. And after Catherine II, the empire expanded to include Finland,
Poland, and Transcaucasia, where civil administration was inseparable from
military command responsibilities. The provincial administration was by its very
nature incapable of coping with this inter-provincial management, and the presence
of regional agents was a necessity.
On the one hand, the geography of an expanding empire necessitated the
appointment of regional authorities; on the other, it brought into full relief the
differences between Russia proper and its peripheral regions. This in turn raised the
59. See note 43.
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question whether governors general were necessary in Russia proper which had
already reached, despite some inevitable regional variations, a high level of
uniformity, with an overwhelmingly peasant population living in a subsistence
economy. The answer would depend on what was expected of a governor general.
During Catherine’s reign, it became obvious that in Russia proper his
administrative authority was not very different from that of a simple governor, that
his post continued to bear the stamp of its origin as a purely provincial one. Thus, a
governor general’s activities duplicated those of a governor and the post was
superfluous, unless the government was willing to transform it into a mere
supervisory one. This is in fact what it became, but even that was considered
superfluous, because the activities of 26 governors in Russia proper could easily be
monitored by the Senate with the help of occasional so-called senatorial
inspections.60 In the peripheral regions, some of them still terra incognita for
Petersburg, the necessity for the imperial government to gain a regional perspective
on a variety of military, administrative, judicial, fiscal, and cultural issues dictated
the retention of governors general. But it also became impossible to give them
uniform responsibilities because the peripheral regions were not only different
from Russia proper, they were also different among themselves. By the end of
Alexander’s reign, some governors general had become true regional managers, as
in the Caucasus and the Baltic provinces; others were merely inspectors,
“supervisors” over their subordinate governors, as in New Russia; still others were
personal representatives of the emperor for dynastic reasons, as in Finland and
Poland. In conclusion: functional administration had won across the board in
Russia proper, while various shades of area, territorial, administration remained
characteristic of imperial management in the peripheral regions.
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